Özet:

Comparative studies on the history of Islamic thought are usually based on the correspondence of topics between disciplines or traditions. In comparative studies on the issue of the nafs, the chapters on the nafs in the books of philosophy and the chapters on the soul in the books of theology are examined. Although this method is not wrong, it is sometimes incomplete and sometimes misleading. This is because, although the chapters on the soul in the books of kalām partially provide the counterpart of the theory of the human soul in kalām, the theory of the soul in kalām is not the counterpart of the theory of the nafs in general. The theological tradition’s description of power (qudrah) includes God, the principle that gives existence, as well as the plant, animal, human, and celestial souls, which are considered the principles that give motion in the philosophical tradition. Therefore, the theory of power in kalām encompasses all the principles of existence and motion. Accordingly, philosophers sometimes call substance together with its faculties as nafs and quwwa, and sometimes they distinguish between nafs and properties and call nafs substance and properties quwwa. Theologians, on the other hand, call the body itself substance and the properties attributes. Power, an attribute, is defined by theologians as an attribute that acts in accordance with the will or as the proximate principle of various actions. These definitions of potency include the plant, animal, human, and celestial souls, which are considered to be the principles that give motion in the philosophical tradition. God, the separate intellects, the natures of the elements, and the forms of minerals are excluded from the definitions of power because they do not act in accordance with the will or are not the proximate principle of different kinds of actions. However, according to the theologians, the attribute that acts on the will or the proximate principle of various kinds of actions is God’s attribute of power. Therefore, natures, forms, separate intellects and God are also included in the scope of power. Therefore, the theory of power in kalām encompasses all the principles of existence and motion. When all types of existence and motion are directly attributed to divine power, the apparent diversity is considered only within the scope of the diversity of divine acts. Thus, the theory of custom (‘âdah) in kalām essentially undertakes to explain that divine power is the sole agent of existence and motion, and that there is no distinction between giving existence and giving motion, as philosophers claim. Since this universal judgment also includes human actions, the theologians mainly tried to justify human power. The theories developed by the theologians about human actions, such as kasb and khalk, aim to create an autonomous space for human voluntary acts within the scope of divine power. In this respect, the theory of potency in kalām is constructed in such a way as to counter philosophical explanations of all the principles that give existence and motion. This article compares the definitions of power with the definitions of the concepts of nafs, quwwah, and nature, and argues that the philosophical theory of nafs has its counterpart in kalām in the theory of power.

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