Özet:

In his groundbreaking work Being and Time, Heidegger meticulously presents a variety of interpretations of truth to construct a satisfying epistemological framework suitable for phenomenology as fundamental ontology. He thus proposes the derivative (e.g. truth-as-agreement/correctness) and primordial (e.g. truth-as-Aletheia/disclosure, truth-as-openness, truth-as-Dasein’s disclosedness) conceptions of truth so that he could account for how his theory of knowledge accommodates with his theory of beings. In this paper, I will provide a comprehensive analysis of how Heidegger construes the notion of truth with respect to his fundamental ontology in which he reconstructs the study of beings. In doing so, I will follow three strands (namely, linguistic, ontological, and epistemological) to analyze Heidegger’s notion of truth considering the features of his fundamental ontology. All these strands of analysis, on the one hand, show what conceptions of truth Heidegger discusses and endorses; on the other hand, they characterize Heidegger’s theory of knowledge in its connection with his fundamental ontology. Hence, I first visit the question of how Heidegger reconstructs his philosophical language to accommodate with his understanding of the question of being. This explanatory section purports to ground Heidegger’s reasons behind his re-reading the traditional understanding of ontology. Then, I will elucidate how Heidegger re-reads the traditional ontology and how he reconstructs it in accordance with his central notion Da-sein. Finally, I will specify what conceptions or conception of truth Heidegger promotes with respect to Da-sein.

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