Abstract:

In this article, the criticism of the Cessâs to the understanding of the Imam Shafiî was directly studied; in addition to Cessâs, it was indirectly contacted with the thoughts of the scientists who criticized this theory and the reasons of those who defend this theory. This is the reason why the people of the world are not happy with the meaning of the Qur’an, but they are not happy with the meaning of the Qur’an and the meaning of the Qur’an. It is possible for him to say that he is the one who gives his knowledge, and that he is the one who gives his knowledge, the one who gives his knowledge. He is not the one who gives righteousness, but the one who gives righteousness is the one who gives righteousness, and the one who gives righteousness is the one who gives righteousness. The Qur’an and the Sunnah are equal in terms of judgment from the beginning. He is the first person to speak a word, and he is the first person to speak a word. After his appointment, he took a five-year-old tail. The Qur’an is the Qur’an, the Qur’an is the Qur’an, the Qur’an is the Qur’an, the Qur’an is the Qur’an, the Qur’an is the Qur’an, the Qur’an is the Qur’an, the Qur’an is the Qur’an, the Qur’an is the Qur’an, the Qur’an is the Qur’an. The Hanefî prosecutor Cessâs not because he produced a theory named Beyân, but because there were disconnections in the definition and taxation of the Beyân. As Cessas says, he does not express the purpose of his definition clearly; the parts of the brain also contain incoherences. It is not a matter of fact that it is not a matter of fact that it is not a matter of fact that it is not a matter of fact that it is not a matter of fact that it is not a matter of fact that it is not a matter of fact that it is not a matter of fact that it is not a matter of fact that it is not a matter of fact that it is not a matter of fact that it is not a matter of fact that it is not a matter of fact that it is not a matter of fact that it is not a matter of fact that it is not a matter of fact that it is not a matter of fact that it is not a matter of fact that it is not a matter of fact that it is not a matter of fact. It is better to remember that the cessation of the cessation of the cessation of the cessation of the cessation of the cessation.

Abstract:

In this article, al-Jaṣṣāṣ’ critiques of al- Shāfiʿī’s bayān concept are examined and analyzed. Al- Shāfiʿī, the disciple of both Imam Muhammad and Imam Mālik , developed a new conception of legal thought (uṣūl) because he did not satisfy the understanding of his time. Although there is no dispute between the Islamic legal schools (madhhabs) over the legislative authoritativeness of the Qur'an, their approach to the Sunnah differs. Both Hanafi scholars and al-Mālik would not rely on khabar al-ahad because of a disconnection in meaning (al-inqita al-manawi) in it and its contradiction to the Practice of the People of Madina (amal ahl al-Madinah) respectively. In addition, Hanafi scholars stated that the Qur’anic general words (‘amm) express certainty and that the Qur’anic verses cannot be allocated with the reports (khabar) expressing suspicion (zann). Al-Shāfiʿī gives central importance to the Sunnah in his concept of the bayān not because he disputed the attitudes of the present legal schools towards the Qur’an, but because he disapproved their approaches to the Sunnah represented by al-akhbar al-ahad. Thus, it is possible to say that al-Shāfiʿī developed his legal though (uṣūl) through the bayān concept, and the bayān concept through the Sunnah. According to Al-Shāfiʿī, since in various verses in the Qur’an God has imposed the obligation on people to obey the Prophet; then, accordingly khabar al-ahad has a great intense significance as well and they are no different from the Qur’an in terms of legislation. Al-Shāfiʿī is the first person to take the bayān out of its literal meaning and use it as a term. The term bayān is, al-Shāfiʿī tells us, a noun comprising several convergent basic meanings which are, however, divergent in their details. After defining the term, he subjected the bayān to a five-part classification as follows: (1) Qur’an by its own; (2) Qur’an and Sunnah together, each expressing the same rule; (3) Qur’an and Sunnah together, whereby the Sunnah explains what is in the Qur’an; (4) Sunnah by its own; and (5) neither, in which case one engages in legal interpretation (ijtihad). Al-Shāfiʿī puts all of his bayān modes around the Qur’an, and he argues that the Qur’anic statements could be accurately understood by mastering the Arabic language. A Hanafi jurist al- Jaṣṣāṣ, criticized al-Shāfiʿī on the grounds that he had inconsistencies in his definition and classification of the bayān theory, and not because he developed that particular theory. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ argued that al- Shāfiʿī’s definition does not clearly state its purpose, and it includes some inconsistencies in the classification. Furthermore, the characteristics which al- Shāfiʿī cites in his definition of the bayān do not correspond to the parts of it. There is not too much of criticism from al-Jaṣṣāṣ against the second and the third modes of the bayān. He says that it is the examples mentioned in the first mode where al-Shāfiʿī uses the term bayān for the first time. Therefore, he describes it as consolidation (ta’kid) or confirmation (taqrir) rather than bayān. It can be said that he did not bring any criticism because Hanafi scholars had the same conviction about the second and the third modes of the bayān. In the fourth mode of the bayān, al-Shāfiʿī examined the Sunnah as an independent source of legislation, like the Qur’an. He strongly argued that the Sunnah can be a source of the divine law for the matters that are absent in the Qur’an. Nevertheless, al-Jaṣṣāṣ rejected this argument and did not consider it as a separate mode of the bayān. According to him, the bayān does not differ according to who said it; however, there is a difference in itself, such as the bayān being compulsory (fard), recommended (sunnah) or forbidden (haram). Al-Jaṣṣāṣ also rejected al-Shāfiʿī’s consideration of the legal interpretations (ijtihad)—which are subjective and include suspicion (zann)—as the fifth mode of the bayān. Because, according to al-Jaṣṣāṣ, when certainty is attributed to an interpretation (ijtihad), one who opposes any ijtihad will have opposed God's judgment. Another reason al-Shāfiʿī was criticized by al-Jaṣṣāṣ and other scholars because he has not mentioned scholarly consensus (ijmā) under the bayān concept. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ argues that it is more suitable to mention scholarly consensus (ijmā) than ijtihad under the bayān concept because scholarly consensus (ijmā) is accepted as explicit evidence. It is noteworthy that some of the criticisms al-Jaṣṣāṣ brought were mentioned before and after him as well. Scholars like Abū Bakr Ibn Dāwūd aẓ-Ẓāhirī and Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī also opposed al-Shāfiʿī’s concept. We can say that al-Shāfiʿī 's theory of the bayān was not adopted when we analyze the Shāfiʿī works on uṣūl after al-Risāla. A Shafii jurist Al-Ṣayrafī, who wrote a commentary on al-Risāla, redefined the term bayān, but that was criticized as well. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ explained that the first and fifth bayān modes of al-Shāfiʿī do not apply according to this definition.

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