Abstract:

The question of forgiveness debated in Europe on the grounds of Nazi Germany and the concept of "German Collective Guilt" is dealt with by Levinas as it appears in Mishna. The Tractate Yoma remarks: "The transgressions of man to God are forgiven him by the Day of Expiation; the transgressions against other people are not forgiven him by the Day of Expiation if he has not first appeased the other person" (85a-85b). This article examines Levinas' conception of forgiveness and his relationship with Heidegger in parallel with how the same concept appears in Mishna and how Levinas perceives it in his "Ethics of Sainthood". With an eye to Levinas' Four Talmudic Readings in which he discusses the question of forgiveness with reference to Heidegger, this article also discusses the conditions of forgiveness for transgressions of man against God and other people and questions if Levinas' discussion has a potential to contain the possibility of forgiving Heidegger. Levinas displays his conception of forgiveness on the basis of Talmudic myths that designate the conditions of forgiveness as 'the good will of the victim' and 'full consciousness of the perpetrator'. The second of these myths that point to the dialectics of forgiveness is handled by Levinas with reference to Heidegger as well as to the "unavailing pain" created by the Nazi terror. Levinas' reading of the myth of Rabi, who transgresses against his master Rabi Hanina and asks for his forgiveness for thirteen years, emphasizes the note that Rabi is "hard to forgive" and transcribes it for Heidegger's case in relation to the Nazi insult: "One can forgive many Germans, but there are some Germans it is difficult to forgive. It’s hard to forgive Heidegger. If Hanina could not forgive the just and human Lord because he was also the brilliant Lord, it is even less possible to forgive Heidegger.” That Levinas excludes Heidegger from the rest of the Germans, associates him with Rabi with an eye to Heidegger's involvement with the Nazi party posing a problem about the possibility of forgiving him and discusses these issues within the framework of sainthood displays the value Levinas attributes to Heidegger as well as the gravity of this confrontation. Thus, this article claims that the Levinas’ “ethics of sainthood”, which is embodied by a sense of infinite responsibility embracing even the transgressions of the Other and reveals the good ‘otherwise than being’, inherently possesses the possibility of forgiving Heidegger.

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Abstract:

The question of forgiveness debated in Europe on the grounds of Nazi Germany and the concept of “German Collective Guilt” is dealt with by Levinas as it appears in Mishna. The Tractate Yoma remarks: “The transgressions of man toward God are forgiven him by the Day of Atonement; the transgressions against other people are not forgiven him by the Day of Atonement if he has not first appeased the other person” (85a-85b). This article examines Levinas’ conception of forgiveness and his relationship with Heidegger in parallel with how the same concept appears in Mishna and how Levinas perceives it in his “Ethics of Sainthood”. With an eye to Levinas’ Four Talmudic Readings in which he discusses the question of forgiveness with reference to Heidegger, this article also discusses the conditions of forgiveness for transgressions of man against God and other people and questions if Levinas’ discussion has a potential to contain the possibility of forgiving Heidegger. Levinas displays his conception of forgiveness on the basis of Talmudic myths that designate the conditions of forgiveness as ‘the good will of the victim’ and ‘full consciousness of the perpetrator’. The second of these myths that points to the dialectics of forgiveness is handled by Levinas with reference to Heidegger as well as to the “unavailing pain” created by the Nazi terror. Levinas’ reading of the myth of Rabi, who transgresses against his master Rabi Hanina and asks for his forgiveness for thirteen years, emphasizes the remark that Rabi is “hard to forgive” and transcribes it for Heidegger’s case in relation to the Nazi outrage: “One can forgive many Germans, but there are some Germans it is difficult to forgive. It is difficult to forgive Heidegger. If Hanina could not forgive the just and humane Rab because he was also the brilliant Rab, it is even less possible to forgive Heidegger”. That Levinas excludes Heidegger from the rest of the Germans, associates him with Rabi with an eye to Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazi party posing a problem about the possibility of forgiving him and discusses these issues within the framework of sainthood displays the value Levinas attributes to Heidegger as well as the gravity of this confrontation. Thus, this article claims that the Levinas’ “ethics of sainthood”, which is embodied by a sense of infinite responsibility embracing even the transgressions of the Other and reveals the good ‘otherwise than being’, inherently possesses the possibility of forgiving Heidegger.