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İnsan Haklarının Felsefi Krizi: İslâmî Bir Perspektif
2020
Journal:  
Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi
Author:  
Abstract:

Hanefî usûlünün kurucu isimlerinden Ebû Zeyd ed-Debûsî (ö. 430/1039), dünya hukuk tarihinde ilk defa temel ve devredilemez insan haklarından bahseden hukukçudur. İnsanın hukuki ve ahlâkî kapasitesini “ehliyet” başlığı altında fıkıh usûlünün önemli bir bahsi hâline getiren Debûsî olduğu gibi, ehliyeti ilk defa “vücub ehliyeti” ve “edâ ehliyeti” şeklinde iki kategoriye ayıran da kendisidir. Bu ayrım kendisinden sonra Hanefî geleneğinde yaygın bir kabul görmüştür. Bu gelenek vücub ehliyetinin zemininde “zimmet”in, yani modern anlamıyla hukuki kişiliğin bulunduğunu kabul etmiş ve fakat modern yaklaşımlardan farklı olarak ehliyet ve zimmeti “emanet” ile, yani Yüce Yaratıcı’ya gönüllü kulluk edebilme sorumluluk ve kabiliyetiyle ve insanoğlunun ezelde Yüce Allah ile yaptığı “İlk Sözleşme” ile irtibatlandırmıştır. Debûsî ilâhî hitabı anlamanın ilkesi olarak aklı, kişinin hukuki ve ahlâkî yükümlülükler altına girmesinin zemini olarak da zimmeti tespit ettikten sonra, akıl ve zimmetin işlev görebilmesi için insanın üç temel ve devredilemez hak ile, yani ismet, hürriyet ve mâlikiyet ile donatıldığını ifade etmiştir. Akıl ve zimmet insana Allah tarafından verili olduğu gibi, bu üç temel hak da O’nun tarafından ve emaneti yüklenen insanın insanlık vazifesini yerine getirebilmesi için bahşedilmiştir. Böylelikle temel ve devredilemez haklar teorisi dünya tarihinde ilk defa İslâm-Hanefî hukuk teorisi içerisinde dile getirilmiş olmaktadır. Batı’da ius naturale ibaresi hem kadîm bir tarihe sahip olan “doğal hukuk”, hem de “doğal haklar”ı kapsar. Objektif doğal hak/klasik doğal hukuk geleneği ödev ve yükümlülük merkezliyken, sübjektif doğal hak/modern doğal hukuk anlayışı bireysel özgürlük ve bireyin egemenliği fikri üzerinde temellenmektedir. Klasik doğal hukuk anlayışı, şeylerin düzeni ve amaçlılık (her varlığın kendisine mahsus bir amaca yönelmişliği) fikirleriyle elele yürür. Böylece kâinat bütün unsurlarıyla amaçlı ve ahlâkî bir düzen olmuş olur. Bazı müellifler modern doğal hakların, klasik doğal hukukun bir devamı olduğunu savunurken, bazıları ise modern doğal haklar anlayışının doğal hukuktan bir kopuşu temsil ettiği kanaatindedir. Leo Strauss’a göre Hobbes ve Locke ile başlayan bu dönüşüm, ikisini farklı doktrinler olarak görmemizi gerektiren esasa ilişkin bir dönüşümdür. Michel Villey modern sübjektif doğal hak anlayışını Ockhamlı William ile başlatırken, Brian Tierney söz konusu anlayışının kökenlerini William’dan epeyce önce, 12. ve 13. yüzyılda yaşayan kanon (kilise hukuku) hukukçularının çalışmalarıyla başlatır. Fakat hiçbir araştırmacı, sübjektif doğal haklar ile 11. yüzyılın ilk yarısında vefat eden Debûsî’nin üç temel hakkı arasında bir bağlantı kurmamıştır. Doğal insan hakları anlayışının Batı’ya mahsus bir icat olduğunu söyleyen ve bu anlayışın kökenlerini en erken 12 ve 13. yüzyıl Orta Çağ Hristiyan hukuk düşüncesinde bulan yaklaşımların yanısıra, doğal insan hakları anlayışının yine Batı icadı olduğunu kabul etmekle birlikte bu anlayışın aynı zamanda modern bir icat olduğunu savunanlar da vardır. Modernitenin özne merkezli kavrayışına yönelik eleştirilerde bu düşünce ortaya çıkar ve bu yaklaşımda doğal insan hakları anlayışı, öznel bireyciliğin ayrılmaz bir unsuru olarak kavrandığı için kabul edilmeyen bir fikir olarak görülür. Haklar ancak bağımsız birer birey olarak kavranabilen fertler için söz konusu olabileceğine göre, toplumu esas alan sosyalist ve komüniteryan düşünceler de doğal insan hakları düşüncesini liberalizmin karakteristik bir unsuru olarak görüp reddetmişlerdir. Böyle yaklaşımlar için haklar değil vazifeler esastır. Hukuki pozitivistler ise hak kavramını, metafizik yüklü olduğu gerekçesiyle devre dışı bırakmışlardır. Batı düşüncesinde John Locke’un (ö. 1704) ifade ettiği ve Debûsî’nin listesiyle aynı olan üç temel hak, zamanla modern insan hakları anlayışının çekirdek fikrini oluşturmuştur. John Locke, siyasî toplumun meydana gelmesinden önceki doğa durumunda her insanın hayat, hürriyet ve mülkiyet haklarına eşit olarak ve ellerinden alınamaz bir biçimde sahip olduklarını ifade eder. Öyle anlaşılıyor ki ilk defa Debûsî’nin dile getirdiği ve sonradan Hanefîlerin müşterek anlayışı hâline gelen ehliyet ve doğal haklar teorisi Locke tarafından -doğrudan veya Orta Çağ hukukçuları aracılığıyla dolaylı olarak- kendi liberal haklar anlayışı içerisine kısmen sekülerize edilmek suretiyle adapte edilmiş, sonrasında ise bu anlayış daha da sekülerleştirilerek (Tanrı ile alâkası tamamen kesilerek) bugün bildiğimiz temel insan hakları anlayışının nüvesini oluşturmuştur. Müslüman toplumlarda toplumsal ve siyâsî hayat esas olduğu için, Hobbes ve Locke gibi düşünürlerin tasavvur ettiği türden muhayyel bir doğal durum (tabiat hâli: status naturae) anlayışına ihtiyaç duyulmamıştır. Doğal insan hakları düşüncesi 18. yüzyıldaki büyük devrimlere ilham kaynağı olmuştur. 1776 tarihli Amerikan Bağımsızlık Bildirisi’nde (Declaration of Independence) Bütün insanların eşit yaratıldıkları ve Tanrı tarafından kendilerine devredilemez bazı haklar verildiği ifade edilir. Bu tarihten 13 yıl sonra, Fransız İnsan ve Yurttaş Hakları Bildirisi’nde (Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen) ise doğal haklar anlayışı kendinde apaçık bir hakikat imiş gibi kabul edilmekle birlikte bu hakların kaynağına, yani Tanrı’ya herhangi bir atıf yapılmaz. Doğal insan hakları anlayışı 19. yüzyılda hukuki pozitivizmin hâkimiyeti nedeniyle metafizik bir bakiye olarak görüldüğü için gözden düşmüş, 20. yüzyılın ilk yarısında ise, iki dünya savaşının oluşturduğu fiilî zorunluluklar sebebiyle tekrar Batı hukuk ve siyaset düşüncesinin gündemine girmiştir. Fakat artık doğal hakların dayandığı metafizik zemin kalmamıştır, bu sebeple günümüzde doğal insan hakları felsefî açıdan bir köken krizi içindedir.

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The Philosophical Crisis of Human Rights: an Islamic Perspective
2020
Author:  
Abstract:

The name of the creator, the name of the creator, the name of the creator. 430/1039), for the first time in the world law history, is a lawyer who discusses fundamental and irreversible human rights. For the first time in the history of the world, he has been the one who has the right to do so, and the one who has the right to do so, and the one who has the right to do so, and the one who has the right to do so, and the one who has the right to do so. This distinction has been widely accepted in the Hanefî tradition. This tradition acknowledges that on the ground of the body driving license there is "symmet", that is, the legal personality in the modern sense, but, unlike modern approaches, it has linked driving license and symmet with "symmet", that is, the responsibility and ability to voluntarily serve the Supreme Creator and the "First Agreement" made by mankind with the Supreme God. As a principle of understanding the divine word, the mind, as the ground of the entrance of the person under legal and moral obligations, as well as the zimmeti has been identified, the mind and zimmeti are equipped with three fundamental and irreversible rights, i.e. the right, the freedom, and the powerfulness, in order to be able to see the function of the mind and zimmeti. As reason and humility are given to man by God, these three fundamental rights are also given by Him, and the man who is charged with emancy is given to fulfil the humanity duty. Thus, the theory of fundamental and irreversible rights has been expressed for the first time in the world’s history in the theory of Islam-Hanefi law. In the West, the word ius naturale covers both the “natural law” and the “natural rights” which have an ancient history. While the objective natural rights/classic natural law tradition is centered on duty and obligation, the subjective natural rights/modern natural law conception is based on the idea of individual freedom and individual sovereignty. The classical natural law concept goes hand in hand with the ideas of the order and purpose of things (the direction of a purpose of each existence depending on itself). It will be a moral and moral order with all the elements of the world. Some advocates argue that modern natural rights are a continuation of the classical natural law, while some argue that modern natural rights are a gap from the natural law. According to Leo Strauss, this transformation that begins with Hobbes and Locke is a fundamental transformation that requires us to see both as different doctrines. While Michel Villey initiates the modern subjective natural right understanding with William of Ockham, Brian Tierney initiates the origins of this understanding far before William, with the work of the canon (Church Law) lawyers who lived in the 12th and 13th centuries. But no researcher, with subjective natural rights. There was no connection between the three fundamental rights of Debussy who died in the first half of the century. In addition to the approaches found in the thought of Christian law of the 12th and 13th centuries when the natural understanding of human rights is a Western invention, there are also those who claim that the natural understanding of human rights is a modern invention. In the criticism of the essence-centric concept of modernity, this thought arises, and in this approach, the natural concept of human rights is seen as an unacceptable idea because it is understood as an inseparable element of subjective individuality. Since rights can only apply to those who can be understood as an independent individual, socialist and communist ideas based on society have also seen and rejected the natural idea of human rights as a characteristic element of liberalism. The rights are not the responsibilities, but the responsibilities. The legal positivists have dismissed the concept of right because it is metaphysically loaded. John Locke’s Western Thought. The three fundamental rights, which he expressed and which are the same as the list of Debussy, formed the core idea of the modern understanding of human rights over time. John Locke states that, in the nature of all people before the formation of political society, the rights of life, freedom and property are equally and in an unacceptable manner. It appears that the theory of authority and natural rights, which was first expressed by Debussy and later became the client-conscious understanding of the Hanefists, was adapted by Locke — directly or indirectly through the Middle Ages’ lawyers — in the way that it was partially secularized into its own conception of liberal rights, and then this conception was further secularized (the relationship with God was completely cut off) and formed the nucleus of the basic human rights conception we know today. Since social and political life is fundamental in Muslim societies, there is no need for a sense of a natural state (status naturae) that the thinkers like Hobbes and Locke have imagined. The idea of natural human rights has been the source of inspiration for the great revolutions of the 18th century. The Declaration of Independence of 1776 states that all people are created equally and that some rights are granted to them by God. Thirteen years later, in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen), the concept of natural rights is regarded as an obvious sign of truth, but no reference is made to the source of these rights, i.e. to God. The natural concept of human rights was revised in the 19th century because it was seen as a metaphysical balance due to the rule of legal positivism, and in the first half of the 20th century, due to the actual obligations of the two world wars, it was again in the agenda of the Western law and political thought. But the metaphysical ground on which natural rights are based is no longer left, so today the natural human rights are in a philosophical source crisis.

Keywords:

The Philosophical Crisis Of Human Rights: An Islamic Approach
2020
Author:  
Abstract:

Abū Zayd al-Dabūsī (d. 430/1039), one of the leading figures in Hanafite uṣūl al-fiqh, is the first who mentioned the basic and inalienable human rights in the history of jurisprudence. Al-Dabūsī, was the first scholar to introduce the concept of “ahliyya” i.e. the legal and moral capacity of men, as an important issue of uṣūl al-fiqh (the philosophy and methodology of Islamic jurisprudence), as well, he was the first to divide the ahliyya into two categories. This distinction was widely accepted in the Hanafi tradition after him. This tradition acknowledged that the “dhimma”, that is, the legal personality in the modern sense, is the basis of the ahliyyat al-wujub, but unlike modern approaches, they have established a firm relationship between the legal/moral capacity of men end the duties of human beings towards the Supreme Creator. Al-Dabūsī determined the reason/intellect as the principle of understanding the divine speech, and he identified the dhimma as the basis for a person to be under legal and moral obligations. After that he stated that human beings are equipped with three basic and inalienable rights, namely ‘iṣma (immunity of life and property), liberty and property, in order for reason and dhimma to function. Just as reason and dhimma were bestowed on the human being by God, these three basic rights were also bestowed by Him so that man can fulfill his duty towards humanity. Thus, the theory of basic and inalienable rights was expressed for the first time in world history by the Islamic-Hanafi legal theory. The Latin phrase ius naturale covers both “natural law” –which has an ancient history- and “natural rights” in Western legal history. While objective natural rights/classical natural law tradition is centered on duty and obligation, the concept of subjective natural rights/ modern natural law is based on the idea of individual freedom and the sovereignty of the individual. The classical understanding of natural law goes hand in hand with the idea of order of things and the teleological conception of universe. Thus, the universe becomes a purposeful and moral order with all its elements. While some authors argue that modern natural rights are a continuation of classical natural law, others believe that the conception of modern natural rights represents a break with natural law. According to Leo Strauss, this transformation that started with Hobbes and Locke is a fundamental one that requires us to see the two as different doctrines. While Michel Villey started the modern understanding of subjective natural rights with William of Ockham, Brian Tierney started her origins with the works of canon lawyers, who lived during the 12th and 13th centuries, well before William. However, no researcher has established a link between subjective natural rights and the three fundamental rights of al-Dabūsī, who died in the first half of the 11th century. There are approaches that admit the conception of natural human rights is a Western invention, and seek the origins of this understanding in the thought of the 12th and the 13th century medieval Christian law. However, there are also approaches that although admitting that the concept of natural human rights originates from the West, argue that this conception is a modern invention. In the criticism towards the subject-centered conception of modernity, this idea emerges, and in this approach, the understanding of natural human rights is seen as an unacceptable idea as it is perceived as an integral element of subjective individualism. Since rights can only be an issue for individuals who can be conceived as independent individuals, socialist and communitarian thoughts have also seen the natural human rights thought as a characteristic element of liberalism and rejected them. Duties, not rights, are essential for such approaches. Legal positivists, on the other hand, undermined the concept of rights on the grounds that it was loaded with metaphysics. Three basic rights expressed by John Locke (d. 1704) in the Western thought which were the same as the list of al-Dabūsī became in time the core notion of the modern understanding of human rights. John Locke says that in the state of nature before the occurrence of political society, every person has the right to life, liberty and property, equally and inalienably. It seems that the legal-moral capacity (ahliyya) and natural rights theory, which al-Dabūsī expressed for the first time, and which later became the common understanding of Hanafis, was partially secularized and adapted by Locke into his own understanding of liberal rights, whether directly by him or indirectly through medieval lawyers. After him this conception was completely secularized and formed the core of the basic understanding of human rights we know today. Since social and political life is essential in Muslim societies, there is no need for an imaginative state of nature (status naturae) conceived by thinkers such as Hobbes and Locke. The idea of natural rights inspired the great revolutions in the 18th century. In the American Declaration of Independence of 1776, it is stated that all people are created equally and given some inalienable rights by God. In the French Declaration of Human and Citizens’ Rights (Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen), thirteen years after this date, the natural rights understanding is accepted as a clear truth in itself, but no reference are made again to the source of these rights, that is, God. The idea of natural rights fell into disarray in the 19th century due to the dominance of legal positivism, but returned to the agenda of Western legal and political thought in the 20th century due to actual necessities that emerged from the two world wars. Still, there is no longer a metaphysical ground on which natural rights are based, so today, natural human rights are in a philosophical crisis of origin.

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Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi

Journal Type :   Uluslararası

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Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi