Abstract:

Many people who consider state functions in Islamic law argue that since God is the sole ruler in the sharīʿa, legislative power should belong to the civil jurists who have the capacity to discover sharīʿa provisions. Because, according to them, juts as jurists discover the laws of nature, they discover the laws set by God, that is, religious provisions, through ijtihād by referring to the source of revelation, and for this reason, only the provisions determined by them can be applied as law. It can be said that this approach, which asserts that divine provisions are enacted through lagislation, although it emphasizes civility, ultimately results in an absolutist and imposing structure, and therefore adds a dogmatic dimension to the legislative function. In the same way, it can be argued that this approach prevents Islamic law from gaining meaning and function in the modern world where critical thinking is accepted as essential. In this respect, it turns out that it is very important to address such an issue. In this study, which aims to determine whether it is possible to impose truth through lagislation in Islamic law, the conceptual framework has been determined. Then, the claim that would be the subject of criticism has been described. Finally, the possibility of the aforementioned claim has been criticized over the three main views put forward in the discussion of iṣābe and khaṭāʿ in the jurisprudence.

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