Abstract:

Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections in 2018 that took place after the transition to presidential regime increased academic interest on pre-electoral coalitions. Due to its prevalence in different countries and its effects on the stability of coalition governments and democratic consolidation, the subject of pre-electoral coalition is widely studied in the literature. However, the limited studies on Turkish pre-electoral coalitions did not deal with some of the variables to explain the formation of the phenomenon. This study evaluates the factors on pre-electoral coalition formation for the case of Turkey and deals with the impact of governmental system change on the coalitions. We found that legal regulations on pre-electoral coalition shape the strategies but do not prevent their formation. Disproportionality and party system fragmentation, which are used to explain pre-electoral coalition formation, are not valid factors for Turkey. However, electoral thresholds, which also increase disproportionality, is the main explanatory factor for pre-electoral coalition formation in Turkey. Although the disproportional electoral system in the 1950s increased the attempt to form pre-electoral coalitions, legal regulations to restrict them resulted with the failure of these attempts and resulted with only one coalition. Introduction of proportional electoral system in 1961 led minor parties to opt for government coalitions that could take place after the elections rather than pre-electoral ones. Introduction of a high electoral threshold in 1983 removed this option and led minor and micro parties to seek for pre-electoral coalitions. Pre-electoral coalitions in Turkey mostly took place between parties with asymmetric sizes, half of the coalitions had two partners, and major parties mostly preferred coalitions with a minor party. On the other hand, if minor parties could not form a pre-electoral coalition with a major party, they sought alliance with micro parties and increased the number of coalition partners in order to increase the vote share of the coalition. Ideological proximity was an important determinant of pre-electoral coalitions and the majority of the coalitions were formed between partners that shared similar ideological outlook. Besides, coalition partners were in opposition in nearly all of the cases. Finally, previous success of pre-electoral coalitions and the positive relations between the partners had a positive impact on the following elections. Transition to presidential regime resulted with changes in these general trends. Despite the removal of bans on pre-electoral elections, electoral threshold remained intact and total vote obtained by the partners was used to calculate the votes required to pass the threshold, which, in turn, forced minor parties to pre-electoral coalitions in order to gain representation in the assembly. Major parties, on the other hand, sought for pre-electoral coalitions with not only minor but also micro parties and increased the number of coalition partners in order to maintain the election of joint presidential candidate in the first round. Moreover, major parties also started to form coalitions with parties of different ideologies and a party in the government formed a pre-electoral coalition for the first time in Turkish history.

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