Abstract:

In international law, there is no directly prescribed duty of states to create the institution of financial ombudsman. However, in practice this institution is in real terms very popular for effectiveness in various forms. This paper analyzes the models of financial ombudsman in some of the leading European jurisdictions as well as the Russian model and its distinction from all these models. The successful introduction of compulsory financial ombudsmen according to a new Russian law is impossible without deep integration of this institution with the general civil procedure legislation. The Russian financial ombudsman is authorized by law to partially create for himself the rules for resolving disputes, which in essence gives him the right to create rules of civil procedural law. Since pre-trial settlement of certain categories of civil disputes in the financial markets through the financial ombudsman system is mandatory, providing him with unlimited discretion to determine the amount of the fee for considering a case, this can create a conflict of interest in his or her activities. The new Russian law is criticized for numerous inconsistencies with civil procedure legislation, without the elimination of which the practical work of the financial ombudsmen will be ineffective. I offer some legal approaches for the development of this institution. The competence of the further alternative dispute resolution (ADR) Russian institutions depends on the success or failure of the financial ombudsman.

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