Abstract:

Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan performed well when it appeared in electoral alliances such as PNA, IJI, and MMA before the 2018 general elections. Being part of the MMA, the Jamaat could not perform well in the 2018 general elections. This study aimed at probing into Jamaat’s pre-poll strategy flaws in terms of reading the voting behavior of the religious vote bank and other factors before the 2018 general elections. ‘Heterogeneous purposive sampling’ technique was applied to cover all possible diverse opinions on the subject. Besides the other causes, just after successfully remaining in power as a coalition partner of the ruling Party PTI in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial government (2013-2018), the Joining of the traditionalist MMA alliance in 2018 just before the general elections severely disappointed the Jamaat’s sympathetic Islamist followers. The JUI and the Jamaat, being the main parties in the MMA, could not create coordination before the 2018 general elections against the PTI’s wave of populism. The emergence of the Tahreek Labbaik Pakistan Party in Punjab and Sindh divided the religious vote bank. In Sind, especially in Karachi, the PTI appeared as an emerging contender to challenge the PPPP and the MQM. In contrast to its previous aggressive mode to acquire the state power, the Jamaat has been addressing the common man problems to enhance the support-base and to attract the floating Islamist voters. Besides these efforts, the Jamaat lost its sympathetic vote bank to PTI due to its decision to join the MMA just before the 2018 general elections.

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