Özet:

The purpose of this article is to focus on the construction of the Serdarabat Dam, which occupies an important place in the relations between Turkey and the USSR, which began to deteriorate towards the Second World War. Turkey, which would benefit from the dam to be built by constructing irrigation canals and a tunnel, had the opportunity to start the development in the region in the early period of the republic by increasing the yield in the Iğdır Plain. The construction of the dam was carried out by an agreement signed between Turkey and the USSR in 1927. The Soviet side completed its duties in a short time and built a dam on the territory of Armenia that could be used within the Iğdır Plain. Turkey, first, had to make some investments in order to benefit from the irrigation facilities of the dam built on the Aras River. Initially, the construction of irrigation tunnels and canals was delayed for a long time. Even in the 1950s, some politicians, especially the Eastern Anatolian deputies, brought the investment process of irrigation canals and tunnels to the parliament. As the Second World War approached, diplomatic negotiations between Turkey and the USSR gained momentum. While the relations between the two countries became increasingly tense, the bureaucrats and diplomats of the USSR excluded the Serderabat Dam from the strained relations. The USSR was almost the sole importer of most of the significant products produced in the Iğdır Plain throughout the 1930s. The bureaucrats of the USSR, who were in constant negotiations and conflicts with the merchants of the region, especially on the import of livestock, were in favor of the farmers of the region benefiting from the Serdarabat Dam, which would increase the productivity of the Iğdır Plain. The USSR, which made a bid through the Soviet institution Turkstroy for the construction of irrigation canals and tunnels, was also in favor of including the project in the eight-million-dollar loan. The USSR was even willing to import Turkey's export products in exchange for the cost of the project. The reason why Turkstroy, which assumed a constructive role without objecting to the projects presented by the Moscow embassy and the Turkish government, could not realize the project was that there was no institution with an institutional counterpart like Sümer Bank in Turkey for irrigation canals and tunnels. If there had been a corporate structure like Sümer Bank, Turkstroy's counterpart in Turkey, in the use of the eight-million-dollar loan for textile factories, the Iğdır Plain could have had an efficient irrigation project earlier. The Eastern report prepared by Celal Bayar has an eminent position in the economic relations between Turkey and the USSR. The report includes the views of Bayar and Turkey's ambassador to Moscow, Zekai Apaydın. Both views contain heavy allegations and accusations against the foreign trade policy of the USSR in Eastern Anatolia in the interwar period. According to reports, Soviet imported products meet the needs of many essential consumer goods in Eastern Anatolia. However, the commercial institutions of the USSR are accused of being uncouth to the people of the region, especially in price policy. The documents used in the article from the Soviet archives prove the contrary of this claim. The most crucial shortcoming of the USSR in its activities in the region was closing the Trabzon and Artvin consulates and not opening a Soviet Trade Representative in Kars. Moreover, the criticism of Bayar and Turkey's ambassador to Moscow regarding the prices of imported goods of the USSR was futile considering the transportation costs. On the other hand, it was a significant disadvantage that the Soviet Trade Representative did not use the port of Trabzon to sell their products to the region. Another situation that was effective in the trade between Turkey and the USSR in the 1930s was the transformation in the foreign trade structure and institutions of the Soviets. The closure of the Soviet trade institution, which possessed the memory of the trade made through the Caucasus, was another factor that undermined the trade with Eastern Anatolia. The plans of the Soviet trade institutions, which wanted to use its geographical proximity in the import and export of Eastern Anatolia, to monopolize the foreign trade of the region, were thus foiled. Ensuring the continuation of the institutions that would keep and sustain the commercial memory of the Soviets could have been a trump card that even Turkey could use in the development of Eastern Anatolia.

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