Some writers have suggested that the classical Sunni kalām theory of divine attributes, which states that the attributes are 'neither God' nor 'other than God,' should be interpreted to mean a denial of the law of excluded middle. Some also seek to build a new kalām without such a principle. Although the author holds such a view to be unintelligible on its own grounds, it also has no basis in the classical kalām theory. This paper shall present a detailed investigation into the meaning of ghayr, and demonstrate, with ample textual evidence, that the classical theory of divine attributes only means a denial of identity along with the denial of metaphysical separability from the divine essence. This paper demonstrates how the term ghayr applies in contexts of metaphysics, theology, and natural philosophy as well. The formula that ‘something is not identical with’ nor ‘other than’ is applied equally to any property of a subject which is necessary and inseparable from it. That is, it applies equally to created beings as well. The paper shall begin with a linguistic discussion of the term ghayr, in order to demonstrate that it is not a negation in the Arabic language, but actually an adjective which also functions to form an exceptive clause. This proves that the formula on the divine attributes does not imply a rejection of excluded middle even at the basic linguistic level. Then the paper will discuss the term ghayr in technical contexts. This discussion does not limit itself to any school, but the discussion is based on four main sources: (1) the Maqālāt of al-Kaʿbī of the Muʿtazilī school; (2) the Maqālāt of al-Ashʿarī, (3) the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd and (4) the Taʾwīlāt of al-Māturīdī. Much attention is given to the latter because of claims by some that Māturīdī has a unique position on ghayriyya which implies the rejection of the law of excluded middle. There is no indication at all that such a formula implied a denial of the laws of logic. Claims to the contrary have failed to provide any linguistic or textual evidence for their interpretation, let alone philosophical justification for such a farfetched view.