This paper investigated the relationship between multiple directorships of directors and their appointment to various board committees. Precisely, using a Poisson model, we empirically examined the effect of the accumulation of outside directorships by a director on the number of board committees he served on. Our study has achieved on a sample of 1044 observations from 89 non-financial French listed companies, for the financial year 2009. The results suggested that directors who hold too many outside directorships serve on more internal board committees. So, our findings indicated that, due to their reputation and expertise, directors holding multiple directorships are more likely to serve on a larger number of internal board committees. Key Words: Multiple Directorships, Committees Membership, Agency Theory, Busyness Hypothesis, Expertise Hypothesis.
Alan : Sosyal, Beşeri ve İdari Bilimler
Dergi Türü : Uluslararası
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