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Wittgenstein’ın geç dönem epistemolojisine yönelik ilgi son çeyrek yüzyıl içinde giderek artmaktadır. Bu ilginin nedeni, Wittgenstein’ın özellikle Kesinlik Üzerine’de detaylandırdığı epistemolojik çerçevenin, modern epistemolojiyi büyük oranda belirleyen şüphecilik tartışmalarında ezber bozan bir bakış açısı vaat etmesidir. Bu vaadin arkasında, her türlü rasyonel gerekçelendirme için kullanılmakla birlikte kendileri gerekçelendirmeden muaf tutulan bazı temel kabullerin varlığı yatmaktadır. Wittgenstein geleneksel epistemoloji açısından sıra dışı nitelikteki bu kabulleri menteşe kabuller olarak adlandırır. Bu kabullerden hareketle, modern epistemolojinin temel problemlerinden birisi olan şüphecilik problemine yanıt sunmanın yanı sıra rasyonel gerekçelendirme, kesinlik, inanç gibi epistemolojinin temel tartışmalarına ilişkin de orijinal iddialar ileri sürer. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı bu kabullerin niteliklerini belirlemek ve bunlardan hareket eden menteşe epistemolojinin sunduğu imkanları tartışmaktır. Bunun için öncelikle Wittgenstein’ın niçin bu tarz kabullerden söz ettiği, daha sonra da bu kabullerin mahiyeti ve çağdaş literatürde bu kabullere ilişkin yürütülen tartışmalara değinilecektir. Son olarak bu kabullerden hareket eden menteşe epistemolojinin sunduğu imkanlar ele alınacaktır.
Wittgenstein's interest in late epistemology has increased over the last quarter of the century. The reason for this interest is that the epistemological framework, which Wittgenstein specially detailed in On Certainity, promises a memorable perspective in the controversy discussions that largely determine modern epistemology. Behind this promise lies the existence of some basic acceptance that is exempted from their own reasoning while being used for any kind of rational justification. Wittgenstein calls these unusual receptions in the traditional epistemology as misconceptions. By moving from these concepts, the original claims on the question of doubt, which is one of the core problems of modern epistemology, as well as the basic discussions of epistemology, such as rational justification, accuracy, belief, are presented. The main objective of this study is to determine the qualities of these concepts and to discuss the possibilities offered by the epistemology of the mouth that moves from them. For this, we will first refer to the discussions on why Wittgenstein talks about these kinds of acceptance, and then the nature of these acceptance and the debate on these acceptance in contemporary literature. Finally, the possibilities offered by the epistemology of the patch that moves from these acceptance will be addressed.
The epistemology that Wittgenstein’s late works seem to suggest has gradually attracted more attention in academic circles past 25 years. This is mainly because of the groundbreaking perspective, promised especially in On Certainty, concerning the debates of scepticism which play an essential role in shaping modern epistemology. What lies behind this promise is the existence of some basic commitments, put into work in every rational justification, while they are themselves somehow exempted from it. Wittgenstein calls these commitments, which are unusual in terms of traditional epistemology, hinge commitments. Based on these commitments, Wittgenstein not only offers an answer to the problem of skepticism, which is one of the fundamental problems of modern epistemology, but also lays original claims to deal with the issues largely debated in modern epistemology such as rational justification, certainty, and belief. The main purpose of this study is to determine the qualities of these commitments and to discuss the possibilities offered by hinge epistemology based on them. To this aim, I will first discuss why Wittgenstein talks about such assumptions, then the nature of these commitments and different ideas about them in contemporary literature will be put under scrutiny. Finally, hinge epistemology and its potential will be deliberated.
Journal Type : Uluslararası
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