Özet:

Qiyās is one of the sources of law, which is used to determine legal qualification (ḥukm) of new cases and has an important place in Islamic law methodology. Although some groups and individuals who reject qiyās as a source of law appeared in history, the majority of uṣūlīs accepted it as a legal source and developed various theories. In this article, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī’s theory of qiyās, who was one of the eminent scholars of Samarqand Ḥanafīsm, is reviewed. In this context, starting from the definition of analogy, the place of analogy in the hierarchy of proofs, its being a source of law (al-ḥujja) and its epistemological value, the conditions required for a valid analogy and its function were examined on the basis of Mīzān al-uṣūl byʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī. In case of need, other Ḥanafī uṣūlīs works were used for the purpose of comparison. Among the methods of validating of cause (ṭuruq al-‘illa), texts (al-naṣṣ) and the method of effectiveness (istidlāl bi at-ta’thīr) were examined. Other inference (istidlāl) methods were excluded. In addition, the disputed issues as the specialization of the cause (takhṣīṣ al-ʿilla), the possibility of an intransitive cause (al-ʿilla al-qāṣira) and whether cause’s consistency (iṭṭarād) is required for a valid analogy were mentioned when appropriate. As a result of the examination, it was concluded that al-Samarqandī’s theory of qiyās dissents from the general Ḥanafī approach in some cases and this was due to difference in understanding relationship between kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh.

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