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Hartmann ahlâkî özgürlüğün açıklanmasında Kant’ın irade özgürlüğü hakkındaki görüşlerini eleştirirken aynı doğrultuda benzer bir yaklaşımla pozitif özgürlüğü (belirlenmemişlik/undeterminiert), negatif özgürlükten (özel tipte belirlenmişlik/plus determination) ayırmak suretiyle yeni bir özgürlük yorumuna ulaşmak istemiştir. O, aksiyolojik belirlenimin değer ilişkisinden yola çıkarak insanın, ontolojik belirlenmişliğini aksiyolojik açıdan aşabileceğini ve buna bağlı olarak da aşkın bir determinasyon formu içinde değer duygusuna dayalı olarak kendisine amaçlar koyabileceğini ve böylece özgür olabileceğini savunmuştur. Ayrıca o, Alman idealistlerinin özgürlük hakkındaki mutlak tinin sonsuz etkinliği şeklindeki özgürlüğü bir geist varlığına bağlayan görüşlerine karşı özgürlüğü, hukuksal özgürlük, ahlaki özgürlük, bireysel özgürlük, içsel ve dışsal özgürlük, eylem ve irade özgürlüğü gibi farklı boyutlarda ele alarak onu insana ait bir değer olarak görmüştür.
hartmann was asked to reach a new freedom review by describing the will freedom of the kant, as a similar approach to the same direction, positive freedom is determined by the addition of the negative freedom of047undeterminiert, leaving the special type of determination form of negative freedom to reach a new liberty by separating the unjustifiedness of the human being, based on the sense of value in the form of ontologically determined, and depending on it, it may also be aimed to him based on the sense of value in a more determination form, and thus being able to be the absolute respectfulness of the individual liberties of freedom to the individuality of the impairment of the impairment of the implicitarianity of self-consciousness of the individuality of self-consciousness of the individuality of the implicitarianity of the impairment, and the implicitarianity of the implications that he-esteemity of the implicitarianity of the individuality of the individuality of the individuality of the individuality of the individuality of the impeemity of self-esteemity of the presence of
Hartmann, while criticizing Kant’s views on freedom of will in the explanation of moral freedom from a similar perspective, he attempted to reach a new interpretation of freedom by separating positive freedom (undeterminiert) from negative freedom (special type determination / plus determination) with a similar approach. Hartmann argued that, starting from the value relation of axiological determination, human beings can transcend ontological determination in axiological terms and consequently, they can set goals for themselves based on the sense of value in a transcendent form of determination and thus they can be free. However, Hartmann referred freedom as such legal freedom, moral freedom, individual freedom, internal and external freedom, freedom of action and will, against the German idealists’ views about freedom as the “eternal activity of the absolute spirit”, which connects freedom to a Geist’s being, taking it in different dimensions such as freedom of action and will alongside defining it as a value.
Alan : Sosyal, Beşeri ve İdari Bilimler
Dergi Türü : Uluslararası
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