Özet:

This work is about the American intervention in the 1964 Cyprus Crisis. In particular, the study concentrates on the Greek political reaction to the US mediation efforts during the crisis. The process that brought about the first US involvement in the crisis started in November 1963, when Makarios sought to change the constitution in order to centralize the government. This move soon led a civil war on the island and after the war, the guarantor powers got involved. Believing Makarios’ “independent” actions on the island were a threat to “peace” in the Mediterranean. The primary objective of the US was to avoid a war between Turkey and Greece and to secure the Natofication of the island. Both Turkey and Greece accepted the elimination of Makarios but disagreed on how to achieve it: “Enosis or Enosis with compensation to Turkey”. Turkey wanted the second option while Greece insisted on the first. Makarios, on the other hand, achieved the internationalization of the crisis by demanding help from Soviets. Under Cold War conditions, the Johnson administration, believing that the second option was the best solution for the interests of all the parties, tried very hard to find the silver lining between the parties however, they failed to convince the Papandreou government in Greece. By examining this historical process, it is proposed to analyze the parameters that led Greece to not accept the US proposals to come to an agreement with Turkey. This will help reveal why the Cyprus issue remained unresolved in 1964, results of which affected 1967 and 1974 Crises and still affects the current deadlock.

Anahtar Kelimeler: