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Parlamentonun bütçe hakkının birbirini tamamlayıcı iki unsuru söz konusudur: Birincisi, yürütme erkinin harcama yapmasına ve gelir tahsil etmesine “önceden izin verme ve sınırlandırma” ikincisi ise bütçe uygulandıktan sonra uygulama sonuçlarını “denetleme”. Parlamento ilkini Merkezi Yönetim Bütçe Kanunu görüşmelerinde, ikinci unsuru ise Sayıştay üzerinden yapılan denetimler ve Kesinhesap Kanunu müzakerelerinde devreye alır. Buna karşılık, literatürde genellikle birinci unsur ön plana çıkarılırken, ikinci unsurun özellikle Kesinhesap Kanunu kısmı pek vurgulanmaz. Bu çalışmada, Kesinhesap Kanun teklifinin TBMM’deki görüşmeleri mercek altına alınmış ve Kesinhesap üzerinden Meclis’in etkili bir denetim yapıp yapmadığı incelenmiştir. 2004-2017 yılları arası Merkezi Yönetim Bütçe Kanunu ve Kesinhesap Kanunu Meclis görüşme tutanakları ayrıntılı biçimde taranmış ve sonuçlar sayısal olarak ortaya konmuştur. Bu bağlamda, görüşme gün sayıları, kanunlarla ilgili toplamda ve madde başına alınan söz ve sorulan soru sayıları, ayrıca verilen önerge sayıları karşılaştırılmıştır. Sonuçta TBMM’de Kesinhesap Kanunu’nun pek önemsenmediği ve bu açıdan “denetim” mekanizmasının etkin işlemediği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.
There are two complementary elements of the budgetary right of the Parliament: the first, the execution of the man to make spending and to raise income "pre- allowing and limiting"; the second, the execution of the budget after implementation of the budget "controling" the implementation results. The Parliament takes the first place in the discussions of the Central Administration Budget Act, the second element in the audits and discussions of the Closing Act. On the contrary, in literature, the first element is often highlighted, while the second element is not highlighted in particular in the Section of the Law of Closing. In this study, the proposal of the Cessions Act was undertaken by the talks in the TBMM and it was examined whether the Parliament through Cessions did an effective audit. The Central Management Budget Act and the Closing Accounting Act of 2004-2017 Parliamentary consultations have been detailed and the results have been revealed numerically. In this context, the number of days of the conversation, the total and article-related words and the number of questions asked, as well as the number of proposals given, are compared. After all, the conclusion was made that the Closing Accounting Act was not much concerned and that in this regard the "control" mechanism did not work effectively.
Parliaments have the power of purse that has two complementary components: First one is to give permission to and put limitations on the Executive body to collect revenues and spend; and the second one is to “audit” after the implementation of the budget. The parliament runs the first component during the budget negotiations, and the second one via audits by the Audit Court as well as via negotiations on the Final Accounts Law. Despite this, in the literature, generally the first component is emphasized, and especially the Final Accounts Law part of the second component is neglected. In this study, Final Accounts Law negotiations are scrutinized to search whether TGNA makes an effective audit by that Law or not. TGNA minutes covering 2004-2017 Budget and Final Accounts Law negotiations are comprehensively inspected and numeric results are put forward. Within this framework; number of negotiation days, taking the floor and interrogation numbers on these laws in total and per article, as well as the number of proposals are compared. The result is the fact that, the TGNA does not pay sufficient attention to the Final Accounts Law, and the parliamentary audit mechanism does not work well in this sense.
Field : Sosyal, Beşeri ve İdari Bilimler
Journal Type : Ulusal
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