Abstract:

The label ‘conspiracy theory’, while part of everyday media discourse, is considered by many as problematic. In this research, we posit that there exists diverging social representations associated with this label and that their relative endorsement is a function of preexisting beliefs. To evaluate this possibility, we examine how generic conspiracist beliefs are associated with two forms of rejection of the label: 1) Belief in a meta-conspiracy theory, that is, the belief that the label ‘conspiracy theory’ was purposely created by the elites in order to discredit dissent, and 2) a particularist view of conspiracy theories, that is, the idea that ‘conspiracy theories’ are too diverse to draw any generic conclusions regarding their (ir)rationality and that the label is therefore inadequate. Across two studies (Ns = 1297), using principal components (Study 1) and confirmatory factor analyses (Study 2), we found that generic conspiracist beliefs and belief in meta-conspiracy theory were tightly related. Moreover, in Study 2, generic conspiracist beliefs were substantially associated with the endorsement of a particularist view of conspiracy theories. Using lexicometric analyses of open-ended questions about the origin and the perceived validity of the label, we identified four main criticisms addressed to the label: historical (real conspiracies happen), conceptual (the label has no clear definition), normative (the label has a negative connotation), and political (the label is weaponized by powerholders). By contrast, acceptance of the label was justified by arguments referring to common psychological mechanisms, as well as similar narrative and argumentative structures. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. Keywords: conspiracy theories, social representations, mixed methods, lexicometric analyses, argumentation How to Cite: Nera, K., Leveaux, S., & Klein, P. P. L. E. (2020). A “Conspiracy Theory” Conspiracy? A Mixed Methods Investigation of Laypeople’s Rejection (and Acceptance) of a Controversial Label. International Review of Social Psychology, 33(1), 13. DOI: http://doi.org/10.5334/irsp.401 Handling Editor: Gregory Lo Monaco Aix-Marseille université, FR X close 1292 Views 257 Downloads 21 Twitter   Published on 19 Oct 2020 Peer Reviewed  CC BY 4.0  Accepted on 18 Sep 2020            Submitted on 27 Jan 2020 Introduction Nowadays, it seems that conspiracy theories (CTs) are everywhere, as the term has made its way into public discourse and has become a popular topic in the mainstream media. This label is used to qualify a variety of beliefs, some of which are endorsed only by few people (e.g., ‘the earth is flat and that fact is being concealed by the evil elites’), others by large portions of the population (e.g., according to a recent poll, 33% of a representative sample of the French population ‘somewhat’ or ‘fully’ agrees with the statement ‘The health ministry collaborates with pharmaceutical companies to hide the truth regarding the dangers of vaccines’, Ifop, 2020, our translation). We could extrapolate and reasonably speculate that nowadays every significant social event generates its share of CTs.

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