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Türkiye, 24 Haziran 2018 Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimi ile fiilen ve resmen Cumhurbaşkanlığı Hükûmet Sistemine geçmiştir. Yeni sistemde Merkezi Yönetim Bütçe Kanunu ve Kesinhesap Kanunu ancak Cumhurbaşkanınca Parlamentoya “teklif” edilebilmekte; lâkin ilginç biçimde yine Cumhurbaşkanının nihai onayına gitmektedir. Bu sistemde Cumhurbaşkanının siyasi parti genel başkanı olmasının önünde bir engel de bulunmadığından; sistem, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin bütçe hakkına ve ayrıca Cumhurbaşkanının da maliye politikası hakkına, olumsuz etkide bulunabilme potansiyeli taşımaktadır. Bütçede hükûmetin bölümler arası aktarma yetkisinin genişletilmesi, hatta bu süreçte Meclis’in sahip olduğu yetkinin Anayasal dayanağının ortadan kaldırılması ciddi bir risk teşkil etmektedir. Yine Meclis adına Cumhurbaşkanlığını denetleyen Sayıştay Başsavcısının Cumhurbaşkanınca atanması ve görev süresinin Cumhurbaşkanının süresi ile aynı olması, bütçe denetiminin “siyasallaşma” riskini beraberinde getirmektedir. Bu sistemde, Cumhurbaşkanı yürütmenin hem hukuki hem de fiili olarak başında bulunmaktadır. Yani maliye politikasının başarısından da Cumhurbaşkanı sorumludur. Oysa Meclis Bütçe Komisyonunun, Merkezi Yönetim Bütçesi üzerinde neredeyse sınırsız değişiklik yetkisine sahip olması ve yeni sistemde de Cumhurbaşkanının bütçe kanununu veto yetkisi olmaması, Cumhurbaşkanına ait maliye politikasının Meclis tarafından tıkanması tehlikesini de bünyesinde barındırmaktadır. Çalışmada, özellikle temsili demokrasi bağlamında Parlamentonun bütçe hakkı çerçevesinde, yeni hükûmet sisteminin bu potansiyel sorunları ele alınmış ve çözüm önerilerinde bulunulmuştur.
Turkey has passed into the Presidential Government System by the 24th of June 2018 presidential election. In the new system, the Central Administration Budget Act and the Cutting Account Act can only be "proposed" to the Parliament by the President; but interestingly, it goes again to the President's final approval. In this system there is no obstacle to the President's political party's presidency; the system has the potential to have a negative impact on the budget right of the Great National Assembly of Turkey and also on the President's financial policy right. The extension of the government’s inter-sections transfer powers in the budget, and even the abolition of the Constitutional basis of the powers that the Parliament has in this process, constitutes a serious risk. Again, the appointment of the Advocate General of the Accountancy, who controls his presidency on behalf of the Parliament, as President and the duration of his office is the same as the duration of the President, brings the risk of "politization" of budgetary control. In this system, the President’s execution is at the forefront both legal and real. The President is also responsible for the success of the financial policy. However, the parliamentary budget committee has almost unlimited power to change the central administrative budget and in the new system the president has no veto power to the budget law, and the risk of the parliamentary blocking of the budgetary policy of the president. The study, in particular in the context of representative democracy, in the framework of Parliament’s budgetary right, addressed these potential problems of the new government system and presented solutions.
Turkey has switched from Parliamentary Government System to Presidential Government System virtually with the 10 August 2014 presidential elections, legally and partially with the 16 April 2017 referendum, and officially with the 24 June 2018 presidential elections. Hereafter, in this new system, Central Government Budget Bill and Final Accounts Bill can only be proposed by the President to the Parliament; however interestingly, then these bills are finally approved by the same President after they pass the parliamentary processes. Because the fact that there are nevermore obstacles on the President to be an official political party leader, the system has some potentials to exhibit hazardous effects on the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s power of the purse, on the sovereignty of the nation, and also on the President’s fiscal policy discretions. Expansion of the right of the executive branch to make transfers between sections of the budget, and even the abolishment of Constitutional ground for the parliament’s jurisdiction to make such transfers exhibit a serious risk on the power of the purse. Furthermore, the appointment of the Attorney General of the Audit Court (that also audits the Presidency on behalf of the Parliament) by the President and the limitation of his/her tenure by the President’s term of office, bring a “politization” risk for the audit of the budget. Another risk is that the President has nothing to do against the authority of the Budget Commission to make almost infinite changes on the Budget of the President, which is the main apparatus to apply his/her fiscal policy; because s(he) has no right to veto these changes. In this study, in the context of representative democracy and within the framework of Parliament’s power of purse, these potential problems of the new government system are evaluated and resolutions are offered.
Alan : Sosyal, Beşeri ve İdari Bilimler
Dergi Türü : Uluslararası
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