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115
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23
Kant’ın tüm düşünce sistemini şekillendiren aklın teorik ve pratik faaliyetleri ayrımı, hareket noktası bakımından problematiktir. Ayrımın kesinleşmesi için önce aklın teorik faaliyetinin, sonra ondan ayrı bir pratik faaliyeti olduğunun temellendirilmesi gerekir. Aklın teorik faaliyeti Saf Aklın Eleştirisi’nde temellendirilir. Teorik faaliyet tecrübe ile sınırlıdır. Bunun nedeni insanın bilebileceklerinin malzemesini sadece hissetmeyle alabilmesi, aklı bakımından hiçbir şeyin verili olmamasıdır. Pratik faaliyetin temellendirilmesi aklın pratik açıdan eleştirilmesini, pratik yasayı da aklın koyduğunun gösterilmesini gerektirir. Kant pratik yasayı, sonsuz akıllı varlık da dahil olmak üzere tüm akıllı varlıklar için geçerli olmak şartıyla, yani hissetmeden tamamen bağımsız olarak ve aklın tek olgusunu teşkil edecek şekilde tesis eder. Bu yasanın, sonlu fakat akıllı varlık olarak insan iradesini nasıl belirlediğini, bu belirlemenin sonuçlarını dikkate alarak açıklamaya çalışır ve bu açıklamaya aklın pratik faaliyetinin teyit edilmesi işlevini yükler. Tek akıl olgusu olan ahlak yasası bilincinin ilk sonucu yasaya saygıdır; ilgi ve ödev başta olmak üzere ahlak kavramları yasaya saygıdan türetilir. İnsanda ahlak yasasına saygıdan başka a priori duygu yoktur. Akıl olgusu ile tek ahlak duygusu olan saygı arasındaki bağı açıklamaya çalışmak, Kant’ın teorik akıl için belirlediği, tecrübeyle çizilen sınırın ihlal edilmesini veya insan görüsünün sadece hissî olması gibi en temel kabullerinin sorgulanmasını gerektirir. Bu nedenle ahlak kavramlarının saygı üzerinde temellendirilmesi, Kant’ın öngördüğünün aksine, teorik ve pratik akıl ayrımını teyit etme işlevini yerine getirmekten uzaktır.
The distinction between the theoretical and practical activities of the mind that shapes the entire thought system of Kant is problematic in terms of the point of movement. To establish the distinction, it is necessary to establish that the theoretical activity of the mind is first, then a practical activity separate from it. Theoretical activity of mind Criticism of pure mind It is founded. Theoretical activity is limited to experience. This is due to the fact that man can only get the material of what he can know by feeling, that nothing is given in mind. The basis of practical activity requires the criticism of the mind from the practical point of view, and the demonstration of the practical law that the mind puts in mind. Kant establishes the practical law, provided that it applies to all the intelligent beings, including the eternal intelligent being, that is, completely independently from feeling and in such a way that it forms the single phenomenon of mind. It tries to explain how this law determines the will of man as a ultimate but intelligent being, taking into account the consequences of this determination, and the function of confirming the practical activity of the mind is charged with this explanation. The moral law, which is the only reason, is the first result of consciousness of respect for the law; the moral concepts, including interest and duty, are derived from respect for the law. Other than respect for the law of morality A Priority There is no feeling. To try to explain the link between the mind phenomenon and the one moral sense of respect requires the breach of the limit that Kant has defined for the theoretical mind, drawn by experience, or the question of the most fundamental acceptance of human vision, such as being merely sensitive. Therefore, the foundation of moral concepts on respect, unlike Kant’s forecast, is far from fulfilling the function of confirming the theoretical and practical distinction of mind.
The distinction between the theoretical and practical activities of reason, that distinction which characterizes Kant’s whole system of thought is problematic in view of his starting point. In order for this distinction to be certified, first the theoretical activity of reason and then the practical one as distinct from it should be founded. Kant establishes the theoretical activity of reason in Critique of Pure Reason. This activity is limited to experience, because human beings receive the matter of what can be known only through sensibility; there is nothing given through her/his own reason. Grounding practical activity requires the critique of pure reason from a practical point of view, that is, it requires to demonstrate that that is the reason which gives the practical law. Kant establishes the practical law on the condition that it should be valid for all rational beings both infinite and finite, i.e., independently of sensibility, and in a way such that it should constitute the sole fact of reason. He tries to explain the determination of the human will by the practical law, as the will of a rational but finite being, through the effects of this determination, and he assigns to this explanation a justificatory function for the practical activity of reason. The first effect of the determination of the human will by moral law, which is the sole fact of reason, is the respect for the law itself. All other moral concepts, primarily the concept of interest and that of duty are deduced from the respect for moral law. In human beings, there is no other a priori feeling. The attempt to explain the connection between the fact of reason and the respect as the sole moral a priori feeling requires either to violate the limit determined by Kant for the theoretical human reason or to question some of his basic assumptions such as the sensible nature of human intuition. Hence establishing all other moral concepts on the basis of the respect for the law, contrary to what Kant pretends, is far away from fulfilling the assigned justificatory function for the supposed distinction between the theoretical and practical activities of reason.
Alan : Eğitim Bilimleri; Filoloji; Güzel Sanatlar; Hukuk; İlahiyat; Sosyal, Beşeri ve İdari Bilimler; Spor Bilimleri
Dergi Türü : Uluslararası
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