Özet:

In hypothetical conditionals known as counterfactual conditionals, the speaker makes assumptions about situations or events that are not true in the antecedent and predicts the results in the consequent. In other words, it is presumed that the statements in the antecedent and consequent -or at least in the antecedent- describe things that do not happen or exist in reality. Counterfactual conditionals do not communicate open alternativity, in contrast to other hypothetical conditionals. On the other hand, while being in a counterfactual context and possessing the same morphological markers as counterfactuals, “imaginary” conditionals (as defined by Declerck and Reed) do not communicate counterfactual meaning. These, however, cannot be distinguished from counterfactuals in context-free circumstances. The counterfactual conditional creates new mental spaces, according to the mental space hypothesis. According to Dancygier, "mental space embedding" can be used to account for "imaginary" conditionals. In this sense, a new hypothetical conditional inserted into a counterfactual space inherits the hypotheticality and morphological characteristics of its superordinate space, but it cannot be read as a counterfactual. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that "imaginary" conditionals, like other "open" conditionals (which are distinct from counterfactuals), convey open alternativity. The superordinate counterfactual space, not the base/reality space, should be used to evaluate this open alternative.

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