Özet:

Over the past 30 years, North Korea’s nuclear problem has posed one of the most significant and direct threats to the security, development, and stability in Northeast Asia. The efforts of the international community, including trilateral and six-party talks, sanctions, diplomatic efforts, and the more recent Singapore and Hanoi Summits, have so far failed to produce any tangible outcomes. The main objective of North Korea is to develop its nuclear program and openly produce nuclear weapons. The international community has placed undue reliance on China's ability to put pressure on North Korea and easily resolve the nuclear issue. To this end, while trying to get North Korea to forgo the development of its nuclear program, China also helped North Korea become a nuclear power. This article seeks to examine whether China’s deterrence strategy is reliable for North Korea. Under the Chinese deterrence strategy, China adheres to the principle of not launching the first and second strikes. While its rivals have provided it to its allies, China has not offered any nuclear guarantees to North Korea. In the context of the US-China rivalry, China is concerned about its interests in Taiwan, South Korea, and the South China Sea. For China, the North Korea nuclear crisis has never been a top priority. The lack of credibility in the alliance relationship between the two countries has made it impossible for China to convince North Korea to complete its denuclearization. Therefore, China's deterrent power has been inconclusive. This lack of credibility more clearly explains North Korea's motivation to develop its nuclear program.

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