Abstract:

In this article, Wittgensteins’ criticism of solipsism and the concept “logical form” that he introduces in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus are analyzed. Firstly, the concept “logical form” to which a central role is attributed in understanding the structure and the use of language, its relation to the world and the central role of the concept in question is examined. Subsequently, the role of the concept “logical form” in the criticism of solipsism is analyzed. In this context, it is first detected that Wittgenstein presents the claims of solipsism as arguments that are built with the rules of logic and “logical form” and it is suggested that these are self-denying arguments. Secondly, Wittgenstein’s claim that the solipsist should be quite and make no verbal assertion in order to be right is examined. Wittgenstein’s claim that the language use is based upon the transmission of verbal reports and that this is only possible through the communication of certain minds is addressed. Within this context, it is concluded that any verbal assertion made by solipsism will lead to a contradiction.

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