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Unlike Hanafī jurists, most of the jurists maintain that qiyās is permissible (jāʿiz) for the origins (aṣl) in which the qiyās rule is invalid, including permission (permission), kaffarah (expiation) and ḥadd (penalties). Shāfiʿī jurists, Imam al-Shāfiʿī and his followers like al-Juwaynī, argue that Hanafī jurists are contradictory since they apply qiyās in many cases despite their judgment that qiyās is invalid, and on the contrary they defend that these are derived from the literal interpretation techniques out of qiyās format. Nevertheless, Shāfiʿī jurists persist that they rule on the qiyās applications through Islamic jurisprudence inference methods (istinbāt) such as Islamic juristic preference (istiḥsān), even beyond qiyās. In his sense of search effective cause: ʿilla (taʿlil), al-Juwaynī focuses on the proper meaning/suitability (munāsaba). He runs the mechanism of ta’lil even in the presence of the deepest proper meaning. He customizes the formulation of the suitability (munāsaba)/proper meaning for the origins in which the Qiās' rule is invalid. Kaffarah and ḥadd consequently expand the validity area and minimize the restricted area for qiyās. Al-Juwaynī’s approach agrees to his rational personality as well as the value that he appreciates for Qiyās. In this paper, the aim of the study is to identify the boundaries and limitations of qiyās in al-Juwaynī's thought with discussions about the disagreements between the lawyers in the specified areas. As a general principle, devoting (taʿabbud) is the foundation for jurisprudence for al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī and reasoning (taʿaqqul/taʿlīl) for Abu Hanīfa. Despite this, Abu Hanīfa and Hanafī jurists consider non-qiyās foundations (ma'dul bih 'anil-qiyās) including the quantified ordinances (muqaddarāt/taqdīrat) and permission (permission) as well as kaffarah (expiation) and ḥadd (penalty) as the banned areas for the analogy (qiyās) and profess that qiyās cannot be applied in these areas. It may be contradictory that they state in one hand that the foundation of rulings is taʿaqqul, and on the other hand, bars the above-mentioned areas for qiyās. On the contrary to their general approach, Shāfiʿī jurists, in particular, argue that it is untrue to absolutely exclude the use of analogy in those areas, which are rather open to Qiās. Al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī and one of his followers, al-Juwaynī, describes that Hanafī jurists' applications do not jibe with their principles so that they do refer the inference methods (istinbāt) (e.g. juristic preference: isḥsān), furthering qiyās although they take qiyās as illicit in kaffarah and ḥadd. However, Hanafī jurists defend that they are not in a contradiction, and indeed they do not apply Qiyas in kaffarah and ḥadd and derive their illations mostly from textual implications (dalālah) that are mostly out of Qiyas format such as tanqīh al-maʿnā (isolating ʿilla), istidlāl, and dalālah al-naṣṣ (inferred meaning). As understood from the relevant arguments, applying qiyās in these areas is directly associated with the issue of potentiality for "the analogy in reason." The type of Qiās that Hanafī jurists consider illicit in kaffarah and ḥadd is the analogical actions made for the reasons. One of the most rationalist representatives of Shāfiʿī uṣūl, al-Juwaynī pronounces that the method to determine ʿilla (cause) is fundamentally the suitability (munāsaba) that can be defined as "rational compatibility." In his opinion, the ratiocination (taʿlīl) is based on this suitability. According to him, the indications of Qiās will be clear or it becomes practicable even in the presence of low-level, implicit suitability. Al-Juwaynī considers that it is licit to apply the analogy for the kaffarah and ḥadd as well as the non-qiyās foundations, including licsat and muqaddarāt or taqdīrat, whether direct or explicit (i.e. The meaning of analogy: Qías al-maʿnā) or indirect or implicit (i.e. The commonality of analogy: Qiās al-shabah). In this context, one of Juwayni's concern is "the matter of inherence in text sources such as naṣṣ or the Qur'ān and the Sunna," corresponding to the area where the judgment is based on a specific reason by naṣṣ. For him, a number of reasonable meanings can be inferred in these areas when it is criticized independent of the uttered words. But the inherence mentioned in the texts of naṣṣ, indicates to avoid the use of analogy for making a judgment. Al-Juwaynī asserts that some fractional elaborate or detailed meanings cannot be obtained for physical prayers and only a set of universal meanings can be imagined. He defines that it is permissible to compare the reasons of physical worship with each other when any appropriate meaning is present. He considers that for the permissibility of Qiās in permsat, it is adequate to find a meaning suitable for the judgment, and besides, the commonality of analogy (Qiās al-shabah) is applicable in the area of muqaddarāt or taqdīrat. Nevertheless, a patient's condition is similar to that of a traveller in terms of permission for not fasting (ṣavm). In al-Juwaynī’s way of thinking, patients should act like travellers for permission to shorten (qaṣr) the prayers (ṣalāh) due to “requiring” as a proper meaning. However, as mentioned by al-Juwaynī, there is a consensus (ʿijmā or ittifāq) on the fact that a patient cannot shorten his or every prayer. Due to this impediment, it is understood that the rule of shortening their prayers (ṣalāh) is permissible for travellers but not for patients (manʿ al-ʿijmā). In criminal cases, the right of oath before the court belongs to the defendant, whereas to the claimant in casāme, an oath method in unidentified murders.  Taking an oath from the claimant is merely inherent to the kasāme application. Al-Juwaynī states that this inherence is known by the principle of being inherent to each circumstance (iḥtisās bi-l hāl), and with this aspect, kasāme is a closed area for qiyās. According to al-Juwaynī, contracts are suitable for qiyās because they have conditions such as offers and agreements explicitly stating the quality and quantity, and mutual assent. He describes that these are the reasons unavailable for Qiyās with regard to their characteristics. With this, the contracts are among the reasonable sources in one respect and the unreasonable in another. Consequently, al-Juwaynī suggests that the analogy loses its functionality or validity in a limited number of the closed areas for Qiyās, which are the static devotional judgments (taʿabbud) having no proper meaning, direct or indirect, or explicit or implicit; the areas where the judgment is made inherent to a specific reason by the naṣṣ (ihtisās bi-l-nass) (as in the example that sacrificing a female goat at the age of less than one year is a specific judgment for Burde b. Niyār). The point leads to the judgment is made inherent to a specific reason by the principle of ihtisās bi-hāl; and banned ʿijmā issues (as in the example of ʿijmā that it is agreed on the fact that patients cannot shorten (qaṣr) their prayers (ṣalāh), like travellers. Al-Juwaynī sees the application of qiyās as licit based on the availability of suitable meaning in all areas except for the above-mentioned issues. That he minimizes the closed areas for Qiās and widely expands the functionality of analogy is the reflections of the value that he gives to Qiās.