Özet:

Aristotle, in the entrance of his work, categories, tells about the four classes of beings. This class of assets is expressed by him in the form that is charged on the subject without a subject, which is in a subject and which is not charged on the subject, which is in a subject and which is charged on the subject, and which is not charged on a subject or subject. These are expressed by Fârâbî and Ibn Rüşd respectively as total cevher, single land, total land and single cevher. In the logic of the suggestions, these classes of assets have an importance in the context of the subject-load relationship. From this point of view, only the total assets, i.e. the total cave and the total land, can be charged on a subject. He is the one who gives the knowledge of the land, and the one who gives the knowledge of the land, and the one who gives the knowledge of the land. According to this, the whole cave gives information only about the substance of the subject; the whole land gives information about both the substance of the subject and its land. Ibn Rushd finds that this approach of Farabi is contrary to Aristotle's intention in terms of the unity and multiplicity of the subjects which the whole of them burden, and therefore wrong. This study tries to explore the condition of the load of the total cave and total land from the classes of beings that may be loaded, through the three philosophers called. Here, first of all, the classes of existence of Aristotle and the interpretations of Ibn Rushd to this, then the approach of Farabi to the ones that may be charged, and finally, the differences in both philosophers by moving from Ibn Rushd's Farabi criticism, are subject to evaluation, by resolving the differences in both philosophers.

Özet:

Aristotle mentions the four classes of existence in the introductory chapter of his book, Categories. These classes of existence are expressed by him as not in subject but predicated to subject, in subject but not peredicated to subject, both in subject predicated to subject and neither in subject nor predicated to subject. These are described by Fārābī and Ibn Rushd respectively as the universal essence, singular accident, universal accident and singular essence. In the logic of propositions, these classes of existence have an importance in the context of subject-predicate relation. From this point of view, only the universal entities, i.e. the universal essence and the universal accidents can be a predicament. Fārābī evaluates the situation of universals predicate in terms of giving information about the substance and accidents of the subject. Accordingly, the universal essence is given only information about the substance of subject, while the universal accident provides information on both the substance of subject and the of accident of subject. Ibn Rushd finds this approach of Fārābī wrong and therefore contrary to Aristotle’s purpose, in terms of the unity and multiplicity of the subject that the universals predicate. This study tries to analyze universal essence and accidents from the classes of assets that can be a predicate by means of the three mentioned philosophers. Here, first of all, Aristotle's classes of existence and Ibn Rushd's comments on it, and then Fârâbî’s approach to those who can become predicates are examined. Finally, based on the Ibn Rushd's criticisms on Fārābī, the difference between the two philosophers is evaluated.

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