Citation Number
2
Views
57
Downloands
33
Bu makale İngiliz diplomatların gözünden 1970 ile 1980 yılları arasında Türkiye’deki ekonomik gelişmeleri ele almayı amaçlamaktadır. Aynı zamanda konunun uzmanı olmayanların 1970’li yıllardaki Türk ekonomisi hakkında daha fazla bilgi edinmesini hedeflemektedir. 1960 darbesinden ilk kârlı çıkan, feshedilen Demokrat Parti’nin devamı olan ve ordunun engelleme çabalarına rağmen 1961 ile 1971 arasındaki bütün genel seçimlerde rakibi Cumhuriyet Partisi’nden (CHP) daha fazla oy alan Adalet Partisi oldu. Adalet Partisi başlangıçta CHP ile kısa ömürlü koalisyonlar kurmak zorunda kaldı. Ancak 1965 seçimindeki net zaferden sonra yeni lideri Süleyman Demirel’in başkanlığında tek başına bir hükümet kurmayı başardı. Demirel oldukça siyasallaşmış bir planlı ekonomi programı üzerindeki kontrol yetkisini kullanarak partinin örgütsel gücünü pekiştirdi. Ama aynı Demirel liderliği altındaki sağ unsurların kendisinden uzaklaşarak Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi ve İslamcı Milli Nizam Partisi gibi yeni örgütlenmeler kurması suretiyle bu gücün giderek zayıflamasına da tanıklık etti. Bu durumu açıklamaya yönelik gerekçelerden biri, sık sık birbiriyle çelişen ekonomik çıkarların giderek atması nedeniyle artık tek örgüt bünyesinde barınamaz hale gelmesiydi. Diğeri de bazı işçi ve öğrenci örgütlerinin giderek militanlaşmasıydı. Birçok askerin de bu endişeyi paylaştığı ve gittikçe artan idari kargaşa ve siyasi şiddete bir son vermek üzere 1971’de ikinci kez müdahale etmeye dünden hazır olduğu açıktır. Fakat gidişatın sorumluluğunu üstlenen üst düzey generallerin mutabık kalınmış bir reform programı yoktu, dolayısıyla 1961’de tanınan bazı özgürlükleri geri almaya yönelik birkaç anayasal değişiklikle yetindiler. 1970’li yılların Türkiye’sindeki oldukça siyasallaşmış ortam ve bunun 1980’de başka bir askerî darbeyle sonuçlandığı gerçeği ışığında, analistlerin sağlam bir hükümet eksikliğine, devlet yönetiminin birçok parçasının siyasallaşmasına ve artan şiddete birbirinden çok farklı açıklamalar getirmesi muhtemelen kaçınılmazdır. Bazılarıysa daha çok, önce hızlı sosyal dönüşümün, sonra da 1973’ten beri süregelen ve Kıbrıs müdahalesinin ardından Amerikan yardımının kesilmesiyle birleşen yüksek petrol fiyatlarıyla Avrupa’daki Türk işçilerinin gönderdiği dövizlerin azalarak döviz sıkıntısına yol açtığı uzun ekonomik kriz döneminin yarattığı gerilim ve ayrışmalara odaklanmaktadır. Gelişmelerden kuşkusuz bunların hepsinin payı vardı. Ama ayrıca üçüncü askerî müdahalenin gerçekleştiği 1980’de ekonomik durumun, 1980 yılının Ocak ayında İMF ile kararlaştırılan ekonomik istikrar planla birlikte epeyce düzelme gösterdiğini de belirtmek gerekir. Ordunun 1980’deki müdahalesinin yaygın bir destek bulduğuna kuşku yoktur. Fakat bu Türk halkının çoğunluğunun uzun süreli bir askerî yönetime hazırlıklı olduğu anlamına gelmemektedir. Generaller elden geldiğince kısa sürede sivil yönetime dönmek istiyordu. 1980’lerin kalan kısmında Türk siyasetine ANAP damga vurdu. Bunun nedenlerinden biri ANAP’ın Türkiye’yi korumacı, içe dönük bir ekonomiden son derece rekabetçi dünya pazarlarına mamul mal ihracına dayanan bir ekonomiye dönüştürme politikasının sağladığı kısmi başarı idi.
This article aims to reveal the economic developments occurring in Turkey between 1970 and 1980, as seen through the eyes of British diplomats. It is also aimed at the non-specialists who want to understand more about the Turkish economy in the 1970s. The immediate beneficiary of the 1960 coup was the Justice Party, a successor to the dissolved Democratic Party, which, despite military efforts to hold it back, won more votes than its rival People's Republican Party (PRP) in every general election between 1961 and 1971. Initially, it was forced to join a series of short-lived coalitions with the PRP. However, after its convincing victory in the 1965 election, it was able to form a government of its own under its new leader, Suleyman Demirel. Demirel was the one who consolidated the party’s organizational strength by using his control over what remained essentially a highly politified program of planned economic development. However, it was also Demirel who saw this same strength weaken as elements on the right defected from his leadership to form new organizations like the National Action Party and the Islamic National Order Party. One reason generally put forward to explain this phenomenon was the further multiplication of often contradictory economic interests that could no longer be contained within a single organization. Another reason was the growing militancy of a number of workers' and student organizations. It is clear that many army officers shared this apprehension, and were only too ready to launch a second intervention in 1971 to put an end to a situation of growing administrative chaos and political violence. However, once again, the senior generals who took charge of events had no agreed program of reforms, and contented themselves with minor constitutional amendments aimed at curbing some of the freedoms granted in 1961. Given the highly politified atmosphere in Turkey in the 1970s, and the fact that it resulted in yet another military intervention in 1980, it is probably inevitable that analysts tend to highlight quite different explanations for the lack of a firm government, the politification of most parts of the state administration and the growing violence. Others concentrate more on the underlying stresses and strains posed first by a period of rapid social transformation and then, by a long period of economic crisis from 1973 onwards, when high oil prices combined with a loss of American aid after the intervention of Cyprus and a decline in the remittances sent back by Turkish workers in Europe to produce a crippling shortage of foreign exchange. In the events, of course, all these factors played their part. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that by 1980, the year of the third military intervention, the economic situation had much improved as a result of the introduction of the economic stabilization plan agreed with the IMF in January 1980. There is no doubt that, when it came, the army’s intervention in 1980 had widespread popular support. However, this does not mean that the majority of the Turkish people were prepared to see a long period of military rule. The generals intended to return to full civil rule as soon as possible. The fact was that ANAP was able to dominate Turkish politics for the rest of the 1980s. One of the reasons for that was the partial success of its domestic policies aimed at transforming Turkey from a protected, inward-looking economy to one based on the export of manufactured goods in the highly competitive world markets.
This article aims to reveal the economic developments occurring in Turkey between 1970 and 1980, as seen through the eyes of British diplomats. It is also aimed at the non-specialists who want to understand more about Turkish economy in 1970s. The immediate beneficiary of the 1960 coup was the Justice Party, a successor to the dissolved Democrat Party, which, in spite of military efforts to hold it back, won more votes than its rival People’s Republican Party (PRP) in every general election between 1961 and 1971. Initially, it was forced to join a series of short-lived coalitions with the PRP. However, after its convincing victory in the 1965 election, it was able to form a government of its own under its new leader, Süleyman Demirel. Demirel was the one who consolidated the party’s organizational strength by using his control over what remained essentially a highly politicized programme of planned economic development. However, it was also Demirel who saw this same strength weaken as elements on the right defected from his leadership to form new organizations like the National Action Party and the Islamic National Order Party. One reason generally put forward to explain this phenomenon was the further multiplication of often contradictory economic interests that could no longer be contained within a single organization. Another reason was the growing militancy of a number of workers’ and student organizations. It is clear that many army officers shared this apprehension, and were only too ready to launch a second intervention in 1971 to put an end to a situation of growing administrative chaos and political violence. However, once again, the senior generals who took charge of events had no agreed programme of reforms, and contented themselves with minor constitutional amendments aimed at curbing some of the freedoms granted in 1961. Given the highly politicized atmosphere in Turkey in the 1970s, and the fact that it resulted in yet another military intervention in 1980, it is probably inevitable that analysts tend to highlight quite different explanations for the lack of a firm government, the politicization of most parts of the state administration and the growing violence. Others concentrate more on the underlying stresses and strains posed first by a period of rapid social transformation and then, by a long period of economic crisis from 1973 onwards, when high oil prices combined with a loss of American aid after the intervention of Cyprus and a decline in the remittances sent back by Turkish workers in Europe to produce a crippling shortage of foreign exchange. In the events, of course, all these factors played their part. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that by 1980, the year of the third military intervention, the economic situation had much improved as a result of the introduction of the economic stabilization plan agreed with the IMF in January 1980. There is no doubt that, when it came, the army’s intervention in 1980 had widespread popular support. However, this does not mean that the majority of the Turkish people were prepared to see a long period of military rule. The generals intended to return to full civilian rule as soon as possible. The fact was that ANAP was able to dominate Turkish politics for the rest of the 1980s. One of the reasons for that was the partial success of its domestic policies aimed at transforming Turkey from a protected, inward-looking economy to one based on the export of manufactured goods in the highly competitive world markets.
Field : Eğitim Bilimleri; Filoloji; Sosyal, Beşeri ve İdari Bilimler
Journal Type : Uluslararası
Article Detail 
Citation Owners
Similar Articles
Download PDF
Journal Information
Listen Paper
Print This Page
Share
Mendeley
