Abstract:

One of the controversial arguments of Islamic philosophers is that, according to them, God knows particulars as universals. For al-Ghazālī, such an argument means that God does not know particulars, whereupon he accuses philosophers for falling into unbelief (kufr). The foregoing accusation by al-Ghazālī makes this argument an ever-green point of debate for Islamic theology (kalām) and philosophy. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, the Muʿtalizite theologian, is among the criticisers of mentioned philosophical view. Addressing the problem in his Tuḥfat al-mutakallimīn fī al-radd ʿalā al-Falāsifa, Ibn al-Malāḥimī, however, brings forth an approach different from that of al-Ghazālī. Contrary to al-Ghazālī, he does not interpret the philosophers’ view as an argument that God does not know particulars. Indeed, according to Ibn al-Malāḥimī, philosophers already accept that God does not know particulars. Therefore, his main objective is to refute the view that God does not know particulars. For this purpose, Ibn al-Malāḥimī tries to explain that knowledge of particulars does not lead to any change in the self/essence (dhāt) of God. There is a unique aspect to the perspective of Ibn al-Malāḥimī. According to him, even though philosophers deny that God knows particulars, their view actually means God does know particulars

Keywords: