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‘Bilim problemi’, fiilen dünyayı değiştirmiş olan bilimin, bunu nasıl başarmış olduğunun açıklanmasına ve / veya modellenmesine dairdir. Eğer bilimsel araştırmanın mantığı açık biçimde anlaşılabilir ve açıklanabilirse bilgi-kuramsal bir modelleme de olanaklı olacaktır. Bu modellemeyi yapabilecek teorik konumlanma olanağı tarihsel olarak felsefeye aittir. Ancak bu modelin, gerçekliği bilme ve açıklama konusunda daha önceki başarısızlığın nedeni olarak görülen metafizikten özgürleşme için de şematik bir ölçüt sunacağı öne sürüldüğünde, bilim problemini konu edinen felsefe kendi içinde bir kopuş yaşamaktadır. Bilim problemi, epistemolojik bir problem olarak konumlandırıldığında metafizikten özgürleşme hamlesi problemin ontolojik boyutunu da epistemolojiye indirgemektedir. Böylece epistemoloji ilk ve neo-pozitivizm ile birlikte tek felsefe haline dönüşmektedir. Bu, ‘epistemolojik dönüş’ olarak adlandırılmaktadır. Buna karşın Kıta Avrupası ekolünde ontoloji halen ilk felsefedir ve bilimi de ontolojik konumlanıştan, bir modelleme olarak değil, eleştirel olarak ele almaktadır. Burada açığa çıkan meta-problem, epistemolojik dönüş ile ele alınabilen bilim problemi ile ontolojik konumlanıştan konu edinilen problemin örtüşüp örtüşmediği, yani aynı problem olup olmadığıdır. Makalenin temel hipotezi, farklı konumlanışların aynı problemi konu edindiğidir. Bu hipotez ışığında izi sürülen içsel perspektif Viyana Çevresi’nden Popper’a ve Hacking’e kat edilen yolda bilgi kuramının içkin bir biçimde ve evrimsel olarak tekrar ontolojiyle, pragmatik bir ölçüt üzerinden buluştuğunu göstermektedir. Dışsal perspektif ise Kıta Avrupa’sından Adorno, Horkheimer, Heidegger’in bilim üzerine ontolojik eleştirilerinin epistemolojik problem tespiti ile örtüştüğünü göstermektedir. Bu örtüşmenin odağında ise Bhaskar’ın eleştirel realizmi bulunmaktadır. Bu iki farklı (uzlaşmaz görünen) konumlanışın kesişimin gösterilebilmesi, bilim probleminin ‘gerçekliği’ni ve şu sonucun kaçınılmazlığını gösterir: Bilim felsefesi yeni epistemolojiyle geri dönemez. Ancak yeni bir ontoloji olmaksızın ileri de gidemez.
The problem of science is about to explain and/or modeling how science that has actually changed the world has succeeded in doing so. If the logic of scientific research can be clearly understood and explained, epistemological modeling will be possible. The theoretical positioning of this modeling is historically based on philosophy. However, when the epistemological model is proposed to present a schematic criterion for emancipation from metaphysics, which is seen as the cause of earlier failure to know and explain the reality, the philosophy about the science problem is experiencing a rupture in itself. When the science problem is positioned as an epistemological problem, emancipation from metaphysics reduces the ontological dimension of the problem to epistemology. Thus, epistemology becomes the first and only philosophy with neo-positivism. This is called the epistemological turn. On the contrary, ontology is still the first philosophy in the Continental Europe ecole. Science is dealt with critically from ontological position, not as a modeling object. The meta-problem that emerged here is whether the problem of science that can be addressed by epistemological turn and the problem that can be seen from ontological positioning overlap. In other words, is the epistemological problem and the ontological problem the same or different? The basic hypothesis of the article is that different positions (epistemological and ontological) have the same problem: The problem of science. The internal perspective, which is traced in the light of this hypothesis, demonstrates that the theory of knowledge on the path from the Vienna Circle to Popper and Hacking met again with ontology inherently and evolutionary way with a pragmatic criterion. On the other hand, the external perspective also shows that the ontological criticism of Adorno, Horkheimer and Heidegger from the Continental Europe ecole coincides with the epistemological problem detection. The focus of this overlap is Bhaskar's critical realism. The demonstration of the intersection of these two different (seen as irreconcilable) positions shows that the science problem is a real problem and the inevitability of a result. The result is that philosophy of science is caught in a cleft stick. With the new epistemology it cannot go back. But without a new ontology it cannot go forward.
The problem of science is about to explain and / or modeling how science that has actually changed the world has succeeded in doing so. If the logic of scientific research can be clearly understood and explained, epistemological modeling will be possible. The theoretical positioning of this modeling is historically based on philosophy. However, when the epistemological model is proposed to present a schematic criterion for emancipation from metaphysics, which is seen as the cause of earlier failure to know and explain the reality, the philosophy about science problem is experiencing a rupture in itself. When the science problem is positioned as an epistemological problem, emancipation from metaphysics reduces the ontological dimension of the problem to epistemology. Thus, epistemology becomes the first and only philosophy with neo-positivism. This is called epistemological turn. On the contrary, ontology is still the first philosophy in the Continental Europe ecole. Science is dealt with critically from ontological position, not as a modeling object. The meta-problem that emerged here is whether the problem of science that can be addressed by epistemological turn and the problem that can be seen from ontological positioning overlap. In other words, is the epistemological problem and the ontological problem the same or different? The basic hypothesis of the article is that different positions (epistemological and ontological) have the same problem: The problem of science. The internal perspective, which is traced in the light of this hypothesis, demonstrates that the theory of knowledge on the path from the Vienna Circle to Popper and Hacking met again with ontology in inherently and evolutionary way with a pragmatic criterion. On the other hand, the external perspective also shows that the ontological criticism of Adorno, Horkheimer and Heidegger from the Continental Europe ecole coincides with the epistemological problem detection. The focus of this overlap is Bhaskar's critical realism. The demonstration of the intersection of these two different (seen as irreconcilable) positions shows that the science problem is a real problem and the inevitability of a result. The result is that philosophy of science is caught in a cleft stick. With the new epistemology it cannot go back. But without a new ontology it cannot go forward.
Alan : Güzel Sanatlar; Hukuk; İlahiyat; Sosyal, Beşeri ve İdari Bilimler
Dergi Türü : Uluslararası
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