Özet:

As the normative legal positivism concept can include a group of criticism aimed at legal positivism, as it can be a thesis that expresses the need for legal positivism to be placed in the legal system and those who participate in this system to understand the law as the legal positivism shows. Unlike all the images directed to legal positivism in this study, it will be argued that the criticism of the form of being actually a normative theory can be justified not in terms of the activity of byzatistic imaging of legal positivism, but in the point of determination and identification of the scope of the imaged reality. The aspect that this approach will not be met by previously made legal positivism defences is that legal positivism acknowledges that the activity is an illustrative activity and focuses on coverage. In our work, H.L. In the context of Hart’s opinions on international law, this will be reflected. Accordingly, although Hart’s local legal analysis can be considered successful, Hart is mistaken in the point that this analysis offers the analysis of the concept of law as general and exclusive. In this context, it will be claimed that Hart’s holding international law out of law without any applicable reason indicates a normative attitude.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Özet:

While the concept of normative positivism expresses the thesis that legal positivism should be entrenched in legal systems and the participants of those legal systems should regard law as analyzed by legal positivism, it also encapsulates a group of criticisms directed to legal positivism. In this paper, it will be argued that the criticism directed at legal positivism in the way that it is a normative theory, regardless of all appearances, could be right in terms of determining and describing the boundaries of the social fact in question, though not in terms of the descriptiveness of legal positivism per se. The aspect of this approach that cannot be met by the previous counter-arguments is that it concedes that legal positivism’s analysis is a descriptive one and instead focuses on the scope of that analysis. In this paper, H.L.A. Hart’s ideas on international law will be examined in the context of this approach. We argue that, though Hart’s analysis of municipal law could be taken as successful, he is wrong that his analysis presents a general and exclusive analysis of the concept of law. In this sense, it will be argued that the fact that Hart excludes international law from his analysis without a valid justification implies a normative attitude.