Özet:

The crux of bank accounting is how to measure and disclose ex ante credit risk, as loan yields and cost of funds are determined by managerial effectiveness and the financial market. This paper examines how the practice of setting up provisions for loan losses by bank managers had changed to preserve regulatory capitals around the 2008 financial crisis. This paper examines the empirical relationship between ex ante credit loss, which is proxied by loan losses provisions, and realized credit loss, which is measured by net charge-off. The empirical relations are examined before, during, and after the 2008 financial crisis to find the patterns of prediction errors of the incurred loss model. This paper obtains evidence that the empirical relation between non-performing assets and provisions for loan losses weakened at the time of a financial crisis. The relations of net charge-offs and allowance for loan losses on provisions for loan losses amplified during a financial crisis by accounting design. After the financial crisis is over, the empirical relation between non-performing assets and provisions for loan losses does not return back to the pre-crisis relation, but to a different, new post-crisis relation. This paper obtains evidence that financially stable banks in terms of the tier 1 capital ratio, return on assets, market-to-book ratio, or dividend payout ratio tend to adjust provisions for loan losses in a larger scale in response to a financial crisis than less stable banks.

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